This paper is concerned with the numerical solution of multiobjective control problems associated with linear (resp., nonlinear) partial differential equations. More precisely, for such problems, we look for Nash equilibria, which are solutions to noncooperative games. First, we study the continuous case. Then, to compute the solution of the problem, we combine finite-difference methods for the time discretization, finiteelement methods for the space discretization, and conjugate gradient algorithms (resp., a suitable algorithm) for the iterative solution of the discrete control problems. Finally, we apply the above methodology to the solution of several tests problems.
Introduction
In this paper we present some methods for the numerical computation of the solutions of some multiobjective control problems associated with partial differential equations. The details about the results and algorithms showed here can be seen in [8] , [9] .
In a classical single-objective control problem for a system modelled by a Differential Equation, there is an output control v, acting on the equation and trying to achieve a pre-determined goal, usually consisting of minimizing a functional J(·).
In a multiobjective control problem there are more than one goal and, possibly, more than one control acting on the equation. Now, in contrast with the single-objective case, there are several strategies in order to choose the controls, depending of the character of the problem. These strategies can be cooperative (when the controls cooperate between them in order to achieve the goals), non-cooperative, hierarchical, etc..
Nash equilibria define a noncooperative multiple objective optimization strategy first proposed by Nash [6] . Since it originated in game theory and economics, the notion of player is often used. For an optimization problem with G objectives (or functionals J i to minimize), a Nash strategy consists in having G players (or controls v i ), each optimizing his own criterion. However, each player has to optimize his criterion given that all the other criteria are fixed by the rest of the players. When no player can further improve his criterion, it means that the system has reached a Nash Equilibrium state.
Of course there are other strategies for multiobjective optimization, such as the Pareto (cooperative) strategy [7] and the Stackelberg (hierarchical) strategy [10] , etc..
Some previous works about these strategies for the control of partial differential equations are the following: In the articles by Lions [3] - [4] the author gives some results about the Pareto and Stackelberg strategies, respectively. In the article by Díaz and Lions [2] , the authors prove an approximate controllability result for a system following a StackelbergNash strategy. In the article by Bristeau et al. [1] , the authors compare Pareto and Nash strategies by using genetic algorithms to compute numerically the solutions corresponding to these strategies.
2.
Formulation of the Problems
A Linear Case
Let us consider T > 0 and Ω ⊂ IR d , d = 1 or 2. We define Q = Ω×(0, T ) and Σ = ∂Ω×(0, T ). We define the control spaces
Finally, we consider the functionals J 1 and J 2 given by
for every (v 1 , v 2 ) ∈ U 1 × U 2 , where ω di , ω T i ⊂ Ω (i = 1, 2) and function y is defined as the solution of
with f, g, y 0 , y d,i and y T,i being smooth enough functions,
The following is also valid for more than two controls (and functionals), for more general linear operators, for different type of controls such as, for instance, boundary or initial controls and for different type of functionals. Now, for every w 2 ∈ U 2 we consider the optimal control problem (CP 1 (w 2 )): Find u 1 (w 2 ) ∈ U 1 , such that
similarly for every w 1 ∈ U 1 we consider the optimal control problem (CP 2 (w 1 )): Find u 2 (w 1 ) ∈ U 2 , such that
The (unique) solution u 1 (w 2 ) (respectively u 2 (w 1 )) of (CP 1 (w 2 )) (respectively (CP 2 (w 1 ))) is characterized by
is a solution of the coupled system:
We show that system (3) has a unique solution. Furthermore, we give a numerical method for the solution of this problem and present the results obtained with this method on some examples. Remark 2.2 A special case is when ω T 1 ∩ω T 2 = ∅ and/or ω d1 ∩ω d2 = ∅. This case is a competition-wise problem, with each control (or player) trying to reach (possibly) different goals over a common domain. In some sense this is the case where the behavior of the solution y associated to the equilibrium (u 1 , u 2 ) is most difficult to forecast.
It is obvious that the mapping
Let us identify mapping A: For every (v 1 , v 2 ) ∈ V , the linear part of the affine mapping in relation (4) is defined by
where
and y is the solution of (2) 
and Y is the solution of (2) with v 1 = 0 and
Proposition 2.1 proves that mapping a(·, ·) is bilinear continuous, symmetric and V -elliptic; mapping L is (obviously) linear and continuous.
Thus, system (3) has a unique solution, which can be computed by the following conjugate gradient algorihtm:
Step 2.a. y 0 is the solution of (2) Step 2.b.
Step 2.c.
Step 3. (w
) and (if necessary) (w Step 4.a. y k is the solution of (2) with
Step 4.b. For i = 1, 2,
Step 4.c. (g
Step
); else:
Step 7.
Step 9. Do k = k + 1, and go to Step 4.a.
A Non Linear Case
We shall consider the Burgers equation with pointwise controls. All the results to follow are also valid for more than two control points but for simplicity we shall consider the case of only two control points a 1 and a 2 . Let Q = (0, 1) × (0, T ). The state equation is
Let us consider ω di , ω T i ⊂ (0, 1) (i = 1, 2) and the target functions 1, 2) . We take as the control space
The goal of each control v i (i =
For every w 1 ∈ U 1 and w 2 ∈ U 2 we consider the optimal control problems (CP 1 (w 2 )) and (CP 2 (w 1 )) as before. A Nash equilibrium is a pair (u 1 , u 2 ) ∈ U 1 × U 2 such that u 1 = u 1 (u 2 ) and u 2 = u 2 (u 1 ).
The algorithm we propose is the following:
Step 2. We get u 1 1 as the solution of (CP 1 (u 0 2 )).
Step 3. We get u Then, for k ≥ 1, assuming that (u
) as follows:
Step 4. If u
as the solution of (CP 1 (u k 2 )).
Step 5. If u
as the solution of (CP 2 (u Most of the descent methods for the numerical solution of (CP i (u k j )) will require the solution of the corresponding gradient, which we can be easily determined by a suitable adjoint system as in the previous linear case.
The following Remark is valid for both linear and nonlinear cases.
Remark 2.3 If y
d,1 = y d,2 = y d , y T,1 = y T,2 = y T , α 1 = α 2 = α, k 1 = k 2 = k and l 1 = l 2 = l, then
the Nash Equilibria problem (3) is equivalent to the classical control problem (CP):
Time discretizations
For simplicity, we consider from now on the special competition-wise control problem (see Remark 2.2) given by the case where
Linear Case
We point out that, for the special case specified above, the mapping A defined in Section 2.1 is 
we approximate problem (CP 1 (w 2 )) by the following minimization problem (CP 1 (w 2 )) ∆t : Find u ∆t 1 (w 2 ) ∈ U ∆t 1 , such that
where {y n } N n=1 is defined by the solution of the following semi-discrete parabolic problem:
and for n = 1, ..., N ,
Similarly, for every w 1 ∈ U ∆t 1 , we approximate problem (CP 2 (w 1 )) by a minimization problem (CP 2 (w 1 )) ∆t . Now, it can be proved that
for i = 1, 2, where
and for n = N, ..., 1,
Nonlinear Case
We approximate U by U ∆t = IR N and problem (CP 1 (w 2 )) by the following finite-dimensional minimization problem (CP 1 (w 2 )) ∆t : Find
where θ ∈ (0, 1] and {y n } N n=1 is defined from the solution of the following second order accurate time discretization scheme of (5):
and for n ≥ 2,
Similarly, we approximate (CP 2 (w 1 )) by (CP 2 (w 1 )) ∆t . Again, the corresponding gradients can be computed by suitable adjoint systems.
Numerical Experiments
In order to carry out numerical experiments we fully discretize the problems by adding a Finite Element Method to the time discretizations.
Linear Case
We For the data of the problem we take f ≡ 1, y 0 ≡ 0 and g = 0. In the conjugate gradient algorithm we take the initial guess (u 0 1 , u 0 2 ) = (0, 0) and the stopping criterion ε = 10 −8 .
We consider the Stabilization Type Test Problem k = 1, l = 0 with finite horizon time T = 1.5, ∆t = 1.5/45 and h = 1/36. In order to see how the non-controlled solution behaves, we have visualized in Figure 3 the computed solution of the non-controlled equation at time t = 1.5.
We consider the case of Different Goals: Figure 4 we have visualized the graph of the computed solution of the controlled equation with α 1 = α 2 = 10 −6 .
In Figures 5-6 we have visualized the graph of Table 1 we give some further results about our solution. Table 1 ) that, when the goals are different, the controlled solution can be worse, with respect to both goals, than the uncontrolled solution. Noncontrolled solution at time t=1.5. Figure 5 .
, y is the computed solution for the following cases: uncontrolled equation (-),
(--), α1 = 10 −8 and α2 = 10 −2 (++). Figure 6 .
(--), α1 = 10 −8 and α2 = 10 −2 (++).
Nonlinear Case
We consider T = 1,
y 0 ≡ 0 and θ = 3/2. On each minimization problem of the algorithm, we get the sequence u k (k = 1, 2, · · ·) by using a quasi-Newton algorithm a la BFGS (see [5] ). We stop iterating after step k if either
We consider the Controllability Type Test Problem α 1 = α 2 = 1, k = 0, l = 8. For the case y T 1 (x) = 1 2 (1 − x 3 ), y T 2 (x) = 1 − x 3 , Figure 7 shows the uncontrolled state solution y(T ) (...), the target functions y T 1 (---), y T 2 (-. -), and the controlled state solution y(T ) (-), when controlling with a Nash strategy. Figure 8 shows the computed controls. In Table  2 we give some further information about several tests. Figure 8 .
The computed controls u 1 (-) and u 2 (--) for the Nash strategy. Table 2 . Computational results for the Nash strategy. NQNM= Number of times the Quasi-Newton Method has been used for each functional. NPES= Number of parabolic equations solved for each functional. Test 1: y T 1 (x) = y T 2 (x) = 1 − x 3 . Test 2: yT 1(x) = 1 2
(1 − x 3 ) and yT 2(x) = 1 − x 3 . Test 3: yT 1(x) = 1 − x 3 and y T 2 (x) = 9 8 (1 − x 6 ). Test 4: y T 1 (x) = 9 8
(1 − x 6 ) and y T 2 (x) = 1 − x 3 . 
